The Tactical Implications of Building Infrastructure in Border Areas.

 

 

 

Is the recent news of China building a bridge across the Pangong Tso an unexpected development ? 

 

Apparently not. China has been building infrastructure on its side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) for many years now. The bridge in question, which is under construction, is likely to cut down a 180 km loop from Khurnak to the south banks through Rutog, and also facilitate easy troop movement between banks of the lake. 

Additionally, China renamed 15 places in Arunachal Pradesh too. And, in light of recent events like at Dokhlam and Galwan as well as Ladakh intrusion, Depsang intrusion, this construction of a bridge, therefore should not be seen as isolated incident but a small part of a larger game plan and it is therefore highly imperative that we indulge in some brain storming to see the big picture, keeping aside the Politics of  military chauvinism.

Is Construction of Road network by China a recent activity? 

China’s road building in the Himalayan region began as early as 1950. China’s approach to land infrastructure has been an integral part of its Tibet strategy. It has been building roads, rail network and bridges since the time it occupied Tibet and in Xinjiang, primarily to mobilise its army to deal with local resistance while the accompanying economic development was secondary. It was akin to what British did in India; facilitate their Rule over Indian subcontinent. 

To keep Tibet under its control, China has built up its military presence with about 300,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops coupled with six Rapid Reaction Forces (RPFs) at Chengdu with the ability to reach the India-China border in 48 hours. China has constructed 14 major airbases in the Tibetan Plateau and there are about 20 airstrips like those we have in Arunachal Pradesh. Add to this is the massive road building projects undertaken by China in both Tibet and Yunnan right up to the India-China border. Of critical value to China’s troop movement into Tibet is the 2000 km Qinghai-Tibet railway.

China has also established vital road-links with Nepal via the Kodari highway, which connects Lhasa and Kathmandu. With Pakistan, China is connected through the Karakoram highway and the Chinese presence in Myanmar is enabled by an open border in Yunnan. Roads have also facilitated China’s economic incursion in these countries and have also enhanced China’s influence in these states.

Advantages that accrue with this vast rail road network closer to India’s borders.

The development of infrastructure has also rapidly increased economic ties with South Asia, which has to a great extent diminished Indians influence in its own back yard. As a result of this vast rail-road-bridge network China would also be able to mobilize its troops and deploy its resources closer to Border in quick time. China reportedly, has the capability to transfer 12 divisions in 30 days into the Tibet from other regions. This enhances the strike capability of China on a border which is approx 4000kms long.

 

Wars are fought between nations to serve their political objectives but battles are fought for the Lines of Communication which ultimately help in achieving the objectives of war. Therefore, in mountains, when the attacker tries to capture and keep the road communication centers open for its offensive forces, the defender’s plan is based on early detection of enemy’s concentration of troops and equipment, identification of the main thrust line, delaying the enemy’s offensive so as to timely deploy the reserves/reinforcements to deny the enemy capture of communication center. The defenses are based on careful selection of GTIs (Ground of Tactical Importance) along the line of communication. 

So if the roads are important for the enemy to mobilize its troops and equipment it is equally important for the defender to redeploy its resources as per the progress of the battle. This implies that the roads in border areas have tactical and strategic implications rather than political repercussions.

 

 

 One of the biggest obstacles to road-building has been the Indian strategic mindset which viewed the lack of roads as a defense mechanism to stop Chinese troop movement deeper into  India’s territory if China did a repeat of 1962. The plan was that even if China launches an offensive in any sector , and crosses LAC , it will have to build road to move its artillery and heavy equipment to support the infantry, which is going to take time.

The Engineers construction capability in mountains is: 1Km of class 3 jeepable track in one night, and 0.5 Km for class 5 and so on. For the enemy to move its artillery and ammunition vehicles it would need a class 9 road which would take at least 5-7 days to complete.  This construction activity may further be delayed by use of air force and holding Delaying positions ahead of the GTI and bringing down accurate artillery fire.

This delay caused to the attacker will then be utilized by the defender to redeploy its resources accordingly and defeat him. 

 

The 50th report of BRO to the Standing committee on defense described the cause of delay in constructing border roads in 2018, it said ;

“It would not be incorrect to say that few years back the philosophy of our nation was that we should not make roads as near to the border as possible. That philosophy is telling today very clearly as to why we do not have roads. It is only couple of years back that we suddenly decided a change of philosophy and said no, we must go as far forward as possible. It is going to take time. Unfortunately, the time cannot be compressed. Whatever we can do, it will take time”.

 

 

 

 

By mid 90s, It was felt that the earlier defensive posture that was based on delay tactics is no longer sustainable as China has over a period of time developed the capability to launch an offensive without any warning, which would make our time plan redundant and ability to redeploy resources in that time frame little risky. Moreover, the terrain near the border on the Chinese side, which was a major barrier to offensive operations, had largely been overcome by the Chinese by developing an extensive rail road network.

Lastly, it was felt that India has also grown militarily and economically and it is time that this kind of posture based on ‘deterrence by denial’ be shed and a more ‘offensive’ posture of ‘deterrence by punishment’ be adopted. This new strategy will not just confine itself to denying Chinese forces territorial gains but will actively impose costs on the enemy and may even open up new avenues of ingress. 

 

 

In the wake of heightened road and track construction work undertaken by China along India's Northern & Eastern Frontiers, India constituted a China Study Group (CSG) in 1997. The Group studied the requirement of road communication along the India-China border that would help quick movement of troops in the event of armed conflict. The Study Group identified a network of 73 roads, called the India-China Border Roads (ICBR), to be developed along the border. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in 1999 approved the construction of these roads by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) under the Ministry of Defence. 

Post-these recent standoffs, both the armies have started developing infrastructure in their respective areas for faster troop deployment. China suffered humiliation when Indian forces quickly moved and occupied Kailash Range on the southern bank of Pangong Tso in early 2021 forcing China to withdraw from most of the locations in a phased manner. Ever since then, China was making efforts to facilitate a swift movement in the Southern Pangong Tso area, and this bridge is a result of those efforts. 

If at all the Chinese escalate their posture, and launch an offensive, given the facilities that would come up in few years from now on our side of the border, the Chinese may find it extremely easy to make deep incursions into our territory as they would not have to build the roads after crossing the LAC. 

 

 

Is our Air force and land force capable to take on China’s superior airpower, and land force? Is India’s air defense structure fully prepared and takes into account Chinese capabilities? 

 

Given the current air capabilities and the chaos that had taken place post-air strike at Balakot in Pakistan in 2019 we can safely assume we are not ready.

 

 

A. Are we not facilitating the offensive capabilities of the enemy by developing roads so close to the border?

B. If we haven’t developed the military prowess to fight the wars on two fronts why are we creating a situation that would facilitate enemy’s offensive capabilities?

C. Have we given it a thought that building roads closer to borders will also help the enemy? China has not just massively improved the infrastructure in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), but it first undertook a massive military modernisation program and has thereafter adopted a more aggressive posture on the India border.

If viewed dispassionately, the construction of roads may give some tactical advantage to India but will it be strategically wise to take on China on land where they are overwhelmingly superior. Instead the correct response should be an air centric response as our fighter planes operating from much lower altitudes will enjoy significant advantage over Chinese fighters operating from 15,000 feet altitude. Combating Chinese on land is playing to their strengths. 

 

Some critics may say that a lot has changed since 1962 and India has now become a formidable power in South Asia in terms of economy as well as military might, so we must adopt a more aggressive posture. But the fact of the matter is that the Indian policy makers mind set has still remained the same as it existed in 1950s during Nehruji’s regime ; Defensive. 

A. India usually pursues strategically defensive war that aims to maintain the territorial status quo. 

B. Our military thinking is based on causing deterrence rather than defeating the enemy and seizing the territory that enemy has taken from us. Recently, Raksha Mantri had said, “in order to maintain a minimum credible deterrence, we have to immediately think about hypersonic cruise missile development”. It is still suggesting that we are reactive.

C. The Indian troops went unarmed to enquire whether the Chinese intruders that flouted the Agreement have gone back or not, as if the onus to honor the agreement lies on us. 

D. We withdrew the troops from Kailash range that was captured by Indian army as a part of pre-emptive offensive so as to expect a quid pro quo. 

 

Therefore, the mind set has remained unchanged, it is surely Defensive ; we are building the roads so that it would allow us to redeploy the resources in quick time to stop any Chinese incursion. And we are not building roads that would help us take back Aksai Chin or help Tibetans gain independence or take back Depsang plains or capture territory in China that would enhance our capabilities to defend Arunachal Pradesh which China claims as theirs.

 

Mr Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, believes the development of feeder roads towards the de-facto border allows Indians a quicker induction towards China-held territories but cautions the edge is only tactical.

 

Lieutenant General (Retired) Vinod Bhatia, a former Director-General of Military Operations of the Indian Army and presently the Director at the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, also does not agree with the assessment that the Indian development of border infrastructure is behind the Chinese aggression. He says “road construction is a tactical move whereas the Chinese actions at the LAC are part of a much larger strategic posturing. China is acting on the political front and using psychological operations (Psy-Ops) by renaming places in India and claiming Indian territories, and giving it popularity on international forums. On the other hand, it is developing military infrastructure in border areas, creating new logistics bases at an alarming pace and increasing its troop strength in the area”.

 

China also must have made assessments.

 

Over a period of 58 years (since 1962), China must have also carried out a detailed study of India’s mindset and it must have appreciated that India’s military mindset is defensive rather than offensive. India is more interested in maintaining status quo on borders rather than changing the border and taking back of Aksai Chin. The withdrawal from Kailash range and sending troops unarmed to Galwan must have confirmed that appreciation.

China having realized, over the years, that India is not likely to develop the road network closer to borders to delay its offensive, It decided to keep developing the road network closer and closer to the border , hoping that someday India will also be compelled to build the road network which would facilitate its offensive. 

 

A. There is no doubt that the full potential of military prowess can be  tapped only if these are supported by extensive road and rail links and in the absence of Rail-Road network the troops may have to fight an isolated battle And so, it is imperative for India to focus its attention on improving overland links to the LAC. 

B. However, at the same time we need to confirm; are we not walking into the trap laid by China. This blind copying of Chinese strategy may also place the Indian Army in a precarious situation. With China enjoying considerable military superiority, it should not happen that they get a Tarmac Road to drive upon after crossing the LAC. 

C. Thus, Infrastructure development and strike capabilities will have to go hand in hand. 

D. India might have increased the number of roads but have they worked on increasing their political and diplomatic boldness? The Galwan incident and the withdrawal from Kailash range is an indicator that it has a long way to go.

 

E. With no signs of slowing down in development of infrastructure by both sides, it is natural that clashes are likely to rise. 

F. If things continue like this, there is a likelihood that guarding LAC and maintaining infrastructure at the LAC will become contentious in the years to come and it may slowly lead to some sort of an identifiable borderline in the way that India and Pakistan share along the Line Of Control. If this happens then every inch will have to be guarded and entire defenses will have to be reoriented as it has happened in J&K which will be manpower intensive. For a layman it implies, what could be guarded by just a Brigade will then have to be guarded by a Division plus.

G. As nationalist rhetoric, both in China and India growing, securing their respective territories through infrastructure development is increasingly becoming a matter of national pride and politics. This can become a major instigator of conflict between the two nations.

H. Therefore, India must carefully study the tactical and strategic implications and must refrain from politicizing the development of infrastructure in border areas.