The gradual shift in the balance of power from West to the East and USA, the sole superpower, no more interested in acting like a Monitor and prefers to work with Regional powers, has enhanced the competition among the major Regional powers. China meanwhile has systematically got into a position of Power to challenge USA atleast in Asia Pacific. It has armed forces numerically many times more than what India possesses. It has also developed its alliances all over in Indian Ocean, Pacific ocean and even as far as Africa and Latin America. It has signed Most Favoured Nation agreements with almost 150 nations.
Using its economic clout China has virtually woven a web around India. China is probably using the same strategy here in South Asia as was used by USA in Latin America. It considered Latin America as its back yard. The U.S. sought to secure its "backyard even if that meant extending support to dictators and despots. From 1870 onward, as the United States emerged as a major world power, the Monroe Doctrine would be used to justify a long series of U.S. interventions in Latin America. So, China, an emerging Superpower is also probably safe guarding its back yard in South Asia, with whatever means possible. It wishes to convey to all; Not A Fly Can Move Without Its Permission In This Region.
It would, therefore because of India’s size, its International status, its liberal and democratic society would be wary of it. Viewing from that perspective, China is likely to remain not just a competitor for India but a Rival state, so, any attempt by India to get closer to US and these naval exercises with USA and other Western Powers in Indian Ocean are going to be viewed as a threat by Chinese to its back yard.
As India’s economic and military profile grows wider, it would naturally face a range of intrastate and interstate security challenges, which it has to manage. The Energy security to sustain its growth, the security of its sea trading lanes, ports and security of even its allies and friends will have to be thought of. For instance Bhutan is a close ally of India with which India has a security accord, similarly with further growth it will have to bear the responsibility of security of smaller nations to stand firm against Chinese bullying.
In view of the above, the rivalry between India and China to enhance their influence , is likely to create problems for smaller countries of South Asia ; Nepal, Srilanka and Bangladesh which have traditionally been enjoying good relations with India. This tussle for influence will be fought not only in Himalayas but also in neighboring countries, implying that both the rivals are likely to deepen their involvement in these nations’ domestic politics.
If we look at these nations one by one we find that this rivalry as of now puts India in a much disadvantageous position vis a vis China and also puts these smaller countries in a precarious situation. India can now no more claim to be an unchallenged South Asian Power.
Srilanka.
In terms of public debt, investments in infrastructure building and trade, China over the last decade and a half has emerged as the largest lender, investor and trading partner for Sri Lanka. India on the other hand has not been able to keep that pace may be it does not have similar capacity as China has acquired today. This provides China enough leverage to may be, elbow out India. On top of that, in early 2021, the Sri Lankan government obtained a 10 billion renminbi (RMB) currency swap facility from China to tackle the ongoing foreign currency shortage. Therefore, when Srilanka cancelled the Colombo Port’s Eastern Terminal agreement with Indian business conglomerate on the pretext of opposition by nationalists after it has already granted Hambantota port on a 99 years lease to Chinese and its Colombo port city development to a Chinese company, It was natural that India would not take this lightly. Moreover despite India and Srilanka signing a FTA (Free trade agreement )under the provisions of SAARC , China continues to be the largest goods exporter to Sri Lanka despite the heavy import restrictions imposed by the Sri Lankan government to control foreign currency outflows .
With the COVID-19 pandemic, the situation in Srilanka worsened, largely due to the significant loss of tourism earning, taken together, the circumstances have put Sri Lanka in a vulnerable position. The biggest concern is that Sri Lanka cannot address its problems as merely a domestic political issue. Tackling Sri Lanka’s external sector vulnerabilities, including the shortage of foreign currency, will require support from external parties, whether China, India, the United States, or even international organizations such as the IMF or World Bank. Thus far, Sri Lanka has excessively relied on China to tackle its external sector vulnerabilities while economic relations with India seem to remain stagnant. At the same time, Sri Lanka tries not to irritate India. Against this backdrop, Sri Lanka is now struggling hard to balance between China, India, and domestic nationalists, all the while trying to save the country from a potential economic crisis. Thus far, it does not look easy.
On top of that when warships being permitted to dock in Lanka ports, and Pakistan diplomats regularly visiting Srilanka and exhorting them to criticise India on abrogation of article 370 and violation of human rights, it is certain that India can no more look the other way and take these neighbours for granted even when the President calls India as its relative.
Nepal.
Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited Nepal four times during his tenure of six years, which reflects the priority that the Indian government accords to its relations with Kathmandu. However, all is not well between Nepal and India, at least at the government-to-government level.
Last year in 2020, ties between the two soured after both India and Nepal, one after the other published maps in which they included Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura region in their side of the territory. Nepali PM went a step ahead ; getting it endorsed by the Nepali Parliament and including it in the constitution. Thereafter, although he tried mending the relations and spoke to Mr Modi on the phone to greet him on the occasion of India’s Independence Day but this coupled with other issues can not be taken lightly by India. Subsequently, three senior-most dignitaries of India, including the RAW Chief, Army Chief, and Foreign Secretary, visited Nepal between October and December last year, to mend the differences between the two countries. Even though Nepal-India relations are largely governed by people-to-people relations, the importance of government-to-government relations can no longer be underestimated
Such visits re-opened the communication channels that had remained stalled for over a year. India, thereafter provided almost one million dosesof Covishield vaccine to Nepal as grant assistance to generate goodwill among the Nepalese people, As per the commitment made, India also provided this vaccine to other neighbours apart from Nepal. As per some, China had assured Nepal of provision of the Sinopharm vaccine, but the Nepalese government has not yet given permission for its import, which might have surely annoyed China.
Over the past few years, rising nationalism is seen everywhere and in everything. From the election of Donald Trump to Brexit, the nationalist policies of the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi and the Turkish president Erdoğan, the success of far-right parties in Italian, German and Austrian elections in 2017 and 2018, nationalism appears to be on rise globally. So, in that sense, it is quite natural thatNepal which has one of the world’s youngest populations and, especially after India’s implicit support for the 2015 blockade on the landlocked country, can not be left untouched by this sentiment ; NATIONALISM, This offers a new generation of Nepali politicians a powerful fuel to mobilise the electorate. Anti-Indian sentiments have been running high. This is one of the reasons why Nepal chose not to attend a multilateral BIMSTEC counter-terrorism exercise hosted by India, in 2018. Nepal’s foreign policy establishment has embraced an ambitious and forward-looking agenda of external balancing and diversification in recent years, especially under the leadership of its Foreign Minister, Pradeep Gyawali. His participation in the Fourth Indian Ocean Conference, held in the Maldives in 2019, reflects Kathmandu’s widening geostrategic horizons, seeking to place Nepal as a critical connectivity hub between China, South Asia and the Indian Ocean region It was this Nationalistic fervor and anti India wave that helped the two communist parties wining a huge mandate in last elections. Thence in line with democratisation and competitive nationalism, Nepal’s foreign policy is becoming increasingly politicised.
The dispute with India has been lingering for years and Delhi’s diplomatic establishment and Nepal watchers were well aware that the border issue could blow up anytime. Although, the Indian road was not built overnight and the Nepal government was surely aware and monitoring the situation in Kalapani over the preceding months and years. The issue took a different turn November last year, when India announced its new political map, after the revocation of Article 370. Some may say that Oli did it at the behest of Chinese and some claim that he took this position to safe guard his Govt by once again fuelling Anti India sentiments.
The trust deficit between Nepal and India has largely affected the implementation of various Indian-aided projects in Nepal. At times, some of the Indian investment projects had been attacked. Besides, Indians are expected to possess work permit to work in Nepal. Vehicles with Indian number plates find it difficult to operate in Nepal. Nepal has not yet opened its border with India that has been closed for nearly 10 months on the pretext of COVID-19..
We know from other recent crises in the region, for example in the Maldives in the aftermath of the 2017-18 Doklam crisis, that China rarely shies away from an opportunity to use India’s neighbours as proxies, especially when its relations with Delhi are tense. Nepal and several other Indian neighbours are young democracies, developing new institutions in a political transition can be cause instability, as we see in Myanmar. And as Beijing’s authoritarian system and appeal is growing it may hinder further democratization.
On top of that when Nepali government is seen caving in to popular reservations about BIMSTEC as an anti-China military alliance driven by India, the Nepali Communist Party creating obstacles to the implementation of a United States-sponsored grant that will upgrade Nepal’s electricity transmission system and connect it to the Indian power grid, and Nepali Govt abruptly cancels Indian projects, And treating China with a different yard stick, it is natural that India would express disappointment, despite assuring Nepali Govt and its people that a Democratic and stable Nepal is in India’s interest.
On the other hand are the recent examples that show how China reportedly brought the two warring factions resolve the issues and keep the alliance of two Communist parties in power, how it pressurized the Nepali media on critical reporting, and how it projected the authoritarian governance model of China’s Communist Party.
In May 2017, Nepal and China signed a framework agreement on the BRI, many China-funded projects such as constructing Pokhara International Airport and the Kathmandu Ring Road expansion are underway. Chinese investment in various sectors is increasing. China, of late, has emerged as the largest source of FDI in Nepal. The inflow of tourists from China to Nepal have been growing exponentially ; almost two lakhs in 2019 from mere 7000 a decade ago.
As China’s political influence grows in Nepal, it is quite likely that Beijing may have, at least indirectly, encouraged Prime Minister Oli to take a bolder stance against India during the current crisis.
The Nepali PM commented that the Indian virus was more lethal than the Chinese one and also claimed that Ram was born in Thori in Nepal and not in Ayodhya. An article published in Global Times, for instance, warned that a three-front war with Nepal and Pakistan would open up if New Delhi continued its aggression toward China. Nepali officials did not refute such claims. This indifference would have surely irked India.
So, with India charming the right-wing forces in Nepal and China wooing its left-leaning ideologues, ideological polarization in Nepal is poised to continue. Only time will tell whether this polarization will help the country achieve stability or push it to the brink.
However, seeking to please China has not really paid any dividends and it has rather plunged the Nation in a political turmoil and its traders are being harassed.
Most of the trade routes with China are blocked by Chinese and to harass Nepalese traders, the Chinese transporters even increased freight charges along the nearly 26 km stretch between the Chinese border point and the Nepalese border..
The erstwhile Minister Lekhraj , expressed his dissatisfaction with the Chinese behaviour on trade with Nepal and asked China to remove the blockade which is kept for then a year over one pretext or the other. He also said that the time had come for Kathmandu to re-think if they needed to conduct trade with China at all. Presently, there are nine trading routes between Nepal and China, including Hilsa, Nagcha, Ko Rala, Gorkha Larka, Rasuwagadhi, Tatopani, Lamabagar, Kimathanka, and Olangchung Gola; of which Rasuwagadhi and Tatopani are most crucial, which have been closed for now two years.
As regards people of Nepal, the anti India sentiment can be anytime fuelled and so Besides Kalapani, there are also few more such issues that may crop up any time in future and exploited by inimical powers for their own vested interests.
Raja Mohan thus identifies the territorial dispute as “merely a symptom of the structural changes unfolding in the external and internal context of the bilateral relationship.” No longer an Indian satellite or exclusive sphere of influence, as it is often depreciatively described in Delhi, Nepal has been embracing a policy of strategic diversification to reduce its dependence on India and enhance its non-aligned autonomy. The rising presence of China across the Himalayas, especially after the BRI has given Nepal an opportunity.
It is amply clear that Nepali leaders often hoping to get Delhi to pay attention to festering problems tend to play the China balancing card as a last resort, This is a risky game, because it raises alarm bells in Delhi, which in turn may tend to resort to coercive tools that can further escalate the dispute. It is also risky because China is always willing to extend indefinite support to Nepal at the cost of its relations with India.
A former Nepali diplomat, commenting on the border dispute remarked ; Although it looks minor, but allowing it to fester is likely to sow the seeds of immense competition and intense rivalry in the sensitive Himalayan frontier with far-reaching geopolitical implications.” Similarly, Dr SD Muni a Prof on International relations and expert on Nepal commented that ; sooner or later, the dispute “will be exploited by the third parties to their advantage, if it is not resolved timely.
As a matter of fact, as regards Border issue, the historical, technical and cartographic claims from both sides will probably lead to a dead-end, with never-ending, clashing interpretations about river alignments and other contentious criteria, so the only workable solution is to seek some form of co-management and it should not be difficult for India and Nepal to think out of the box and find a practical solution.
Most importantly, driven by a new logic of interdependence and connectivity, India invested in upgrading its cross-border infrastructure and economic assistance: there are now new rail and road links, an electronic cargo system for Nepali goods to transit via Indian ports, inland waterway navigation plans, and a new cross-border pipeline for petroleum products. These are just some examples of the many achievements of India’s new connectivity strategy, focused on delivering more, better and faster to support the development objectives of Nepal and other neighbours.
India thus has to work relentlessly on its strengths inorder to manage its difficult neighborhood and now with Taliban just a month away from power , China would complete the encirclement. SAARC it appears as of now, is just a History.
Author. Col N Bhatnagar is an alumnus of NDA, Prestigious Def Services Staff College and XLRI. He served in Indian army as an Infantry Officer in all parts of the country and also in Srilanka and has also worked with Reputed Companies - Power, Hospitality and Health Care sector . He has also worked as a National Assesssor of CII for its CII-EXIM Bank Award and HR Excellence award. He has also authored Three Books.
Disclaimer. The views expressed are of Author.