The long wait.
Last year feburary Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar (Retd), an 80 years old airforce pilot became the oldest man to fly the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas. When spoken to, he expressed his delight , Not because the retired IAF officer, was the oldest man to fly the Tejas But because he had seen the aircraft mature into a full-fledged operational fighter from the days of the drawing board. As a test pilot, he was in the Tejas hot seat for the fighter’s first 98 flights as the program director of the project way back in 90s.
It was in 1983 that the Government of India, then led by Indira Gandhi, rolled out a project to build a new LCA as a replacement for the Russian MiG-21s. The plan was to carry out the first flight of the new aircraft by 1994. However, the first prototype of LCA flew only in 2001. It was at the time that the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee named the LCA “Tejas”. In December 2013, the Tejas got Initial Operational Clearance and, in 2019, the IAF was given the first aircraft with Final Operational Clearance.
This tells us as to how lengthy, tedious and frustrating is the route to develop and manufacture a sophisticated war machinery indigenously. This is the story of almost all military equipment that India tried manufacturing locally ; the Arjun TANK,the Prithvi, Agni , Akash missiles, the Pinakas, etc .They have taken a long time to reach the customer and sadly the world did not wait for them and by the time they get inducted the technology gets obsolete and the customer once again puts up a fresh demand LIST, after all, the enemies that he has to fight have already moved ahead and are equipping themselves with the latest.
Now that the Cabinet Committee on Security approved a Rs 48,000-crore deal for 83 Tejas, which include 73 Mark 1A versionsNAND 10X mK 1, which will be provided by the Govt managed Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). Implying each aircraft is costing almost 500 crores. This is over and above thousands of crores already spent on its Development.
It is hell of a lot of money and so as a tax payer, it is our responsibility to evaluate and examine as to how our money is being spent by the Govt and whether the tall claims made by the Govt and its officials meet our security needs. More over, why does Govt owned factories take so much time that may lead to cost escalation and even then no action is taken against the erring manufacturer. Unless the tax payer starts objecting to this gross mismangement , the Govt owned manufacturer will have no concern for the Quality and Schedule of supply.
We must remember that gone are the days when wars were fought in a battle field of few sq kms or on borders, and the citizens could go on doing their job unconcerned about what is happening on the front. With improvement in technology , Today's armed conflicts look quite different: city centers and residential areas can become battle fields. Wars can now move into the lives, cities and homes of ordinary people in a more vicious way than ever before, and impact our livelihoods and occupations.
In view of the above, as regards the Airforce, we as tax payers need to understand following ;
1. What are the Capabilities of IAF and What are the Grey Areas.
A. In order to defend the country against potential hostile actions and provide deterrence against both Pakistan and China, the IAF is ill equipped. In 2018, the then Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal BS Dhanoa had mentioned, “Our numbers are not adequate to fully execute an air campaign in a two-front scenario.”
B. It operates numerous types of aircrafts simultaneously than almost any other air force. It currently flies Mig-21, Mig-27, Mig-29, Jaguar, Mirage 2000, Su-30MKI, Tejas and the Rafale. With such an astounding diversity, ranging from extremely old and on their way to retirement to cutting edge , state of the art multi-role aircrafts, the air force faces massive logistics, training and maintenance challenges.
C. With the progressive phasing out of the obsolete MiG-21s, MiG-23s and MiG-27s, the force is down to just about 30-31 squadrons (each has 16-18 jets) when at least 44 are required to tackle the “collusive” threat from China and Pakistan. The remaining four MiG-21 “Bisons” squadrons are also slated to retire by 2024, so by the time Tejas Mk 1 and Mk 1A are supplied by HAL (Please refer to Para 3C….for schedule) IAF may be reduced to barely 26 -27 squadrons, which does not augur well for our security.
D. At present, the IAF is undergoing a phase out process of Mig-21, which was a fine interceptor in the 1960s and 1970s . This leaves the bulk of Indian air Defence duties to be handled by the Su-30MKI multirole fighter fleet, alongside the exclusively air-to-air Mig 29s and the multirole Mirage 2000-5 fleet.
E. The indigenously produced Tejas Mark 1 has so far proven inadequate for IAF’s needs; and so development of an improved Mark 1A was a matter of priority in order to minimise the numerical shortfall created by the final retirement of the remaining Mig-21s. The IAF currently has two squadrons of Tejas Mk 1, But Mark 1A will come between 2024 and 2030.
F. The 36 Rafale swing-role fighters that are being procured directly from France will certainly help meet India’s air defence requirements, given the potent air superiority capabilities of the type, but it is too small a number to provide much of an answer to India’s requirements for defending its vast airspace from intruders and potential hostile strikes. It is expected that the full deliveries of 36 Rafale aircraft will be completed well before April 2022 as announced by Union defence minister Rajnath Singh in Parliament. By now India has received 26 Rafael aircrafts.
G. India had ordered 272 Su-30MKIs and has, so far, received over 240 of the heavy fighters. It is therefore expected that IAF would have around 55 Mirage 2000s, 70 Mig-29s and 36 Rafales, as well as 123 Tejas 1, 1A The total comes to 35-36 squadrons. But the Tejas Mk 1A /2 are likely to be available not before 2026-27 right now IAF has only 40 of them. This means there will be a huge shortfall.
H. Su-30Mk1
i. has a huge radar cross-section (RCS) and can be detected long before it can detect opposing fighters. With a mix of long and short-range missiles and different seeker heads, the Su-30MKI is a dangerous opponent for non-stealth fighters of the fourth and 4.5 generations. However, against fifth generation fighters such as the F-22 Raptor and F-35, as well as China’s developing J-20A, the aircraft has few answers. Stealth aircraft will always be able to detect the Su-30MKI from very long range.
ii. For the task of carrying the main weight of GUARDING India’s airspace and conducting multirole air superiority and strike missions against Pakistan in a future conflict, the Su-30MKI is likely to give the IAF a capable and potent core fleet for the next ONE DECADE. As, against Chinese Su-35, J-10B and J-11 fighters, it is at least equalled in most scenarios; but the J-20A and future Chinese stealth aircraft will significantly outclass it.
iii. Further, the Su-30MKI is not credible against modern air defence networks, due to very high RCS, heat signature and, at best, average electronic warfare and jamming capabilities. This means that, for deterrence purposes, it is not credible against China and will slowly lose its capability to conduct deep strike missions in Pakistan as the latter improves its air defences.
I. The Mirage 2000-5, currently being upgraded and modernised at the Indian Mark 2 standard, remains a capable and efficient lightweight fighter but cannot offer any BVR improvements over the Su-30MKI. It is a rough analogy in capability terms at medium and short ranges with China’s J-10A, Pakistan’s F-16, and only provides a marginal superiority over the Chinese JF-17.
J. Meanwhile, the Mig-29 is an ageing design, which remains formidably maneuverable within visual range but once again has the same draw back ; huge RCS and being desperately short legged on internal fuel. It remains a limited capability interceptor for the IAF with little technology-growth potential.
K. India’s two strike and interdiction fast jets, the Jaguar and Mig-27, are both long past their prime against peer-competitors in spite of several engine, avionics and weaponry upgrade programmes during their long service lives. Both the Mig-27 and upgraded Indian Jaguar DARIN III have very limited self-defence capabilities, so would have to be closely escorted by dedicated fighter types during medium-level sorties into hostile airspace, thereby further reducing the number of Indian fighters available for air defence/superiority missions. Following a spate of crashes due to technical failures, the IAF is aiming to retire its entire Mig-27 fleet by 2024, and has already started decommissioning individual airframes.
L. The Rafale is surely a highly capable air combat capability for the IAF but, 36 is a very small fleet to defend such a large airspace; the 36 Rafales will be extremely capable in the strike role, but are being bought in completely insufficient numbers to replace the 125 Jaguars and around 85 Mig-27MLs still in IAF service.
M. As regards Tejas , It does not even meet the current requirements and so the upgraded version 1A has to be procured to match the Pakis F16s and Chinese aircrafts currently in use. And Tejas Mk 2 has to be designed and procured in sizeable numbers by the time Chinese deploy J20s.
N. HAL’s shortcomings.The Tejas story and procurement of Rafael has exposed some uncomfortable realities for India’s defense aviation industry. While HAL could upgrade existing airframes with a variety of avionics, weapons and engines—for example, the Jaguar and Mirage 2000 but at the same time HAL has taken many years, huge resources to produce a lightweight fighter with modest conventional capabilities and serious quality control issues. The inability to work out satisfactory arrangements to manufacture the 4.5 generation Rafale in India was not just a matter of price, but was also an outcome of HAL’s unsuitability to ensure sufficient quality control for manufacturing modern high performance fighter aircraft. The task of producing a fifth generation fighter—or sixth—will be a far more formidable undertaking, unless HAL is appropriately reorganized and Private sector is roped in. Moreover, its ability to up the production rate is also doubtful.
O. By 2022-24 IAF will lose another 14 squadrons of the vintage MiG 21s and MiG 27s and the force would largely depend on Su-30 MKI and MiG 29s, the French-made Mirage 2000s and upgraded Jaguars. An upgrade of the Jaguar fighters being carried out by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited or HAL has been delayed by two years.
So, in view of the above we find that it will require a colossal effort on the part of HAL and the Govt to make IAF combat fit for a war on two fronts. Leave aside two fronts even against Pakistan its superiority over a period of time has greatly depleted when we take into account the Pakistan’s superior air defense system.
2. The next that as a layman we need to examine is what is going to be the nature of threat and the nature of warfare in foreseeable future of 10-15 years, because it is based on this that the weapon systems are planned , designed and procured. Armed forces are an equipment oriented organization. They are equipped to meet the current threats and the acquisition planning, beinga continuous process is based on the future threat perception so that when the equipment is inducted into service some 10-20 years later it is able to meet the then existing threats. Hence when it comes to equipping IAF we need to look at a long term basis ; What is Pakistan and China going to have in future may be 10-20 years from now and how would the warfare likely to be.
A. In the medium term, the IAF needs to decide whether it is aiming to offer a serious challenge to the growing might of the Chinese Air force or not. If the main effort is to remain focused on Pakistan, then the current acquisition programme for Indian combat airpower is probably technologically adequate but remains short on numbers. If offering a serious aerial challenge to Chinese freedom of action in India’s backyard is the intention then, the IAF is seriously falling short in both the quality and quantity of its fighter force by even 2030. Indigenous fighter development efforts are unlikely to solve this problem.
B. None of the type of aircrafts at present operational in the IAF can hope to survive deep inside Chinese HQ 9 missile engagement zone (MEZ). However, it is well within the capabilities of the IAF to adequately defend Indian airspace and provide a powerful deterrent against Pakistan, given its level of technical competence and funding, provided it continues to invest in modern air defence missile and radar systems optimally.
C. The concept of Proxy war as it appears now after the success of Taliban will surely be the new way of waging warfare against the target country. In that sense unmanned aerial vehicles to track and target terrorist camps, hideouts, will be need of the hour.
D. India also now need to look towards its seas as it grows in power and its economy grows. The Air force will have to be suitably geared up to provide air cover to the blue water navy and also guard trading routes in Indian ocean and Arabian sea and so on.
E. In view of the aggressive foreign policies of China it has also to play an active role as a deterrent against China so as to help out small littoral states.
F. As the wars are going to be intense and short the IAF must have the ability to react swiftly, cause max damage in short time at the desired target, be able to lift and move troops and their war machinery to the designated place in support of the ground forces.
G. Given the future geo political situation, The wars are likely to be short and sharp; more challenging & unpredictable, requiring a capability for assured, clean, swift, calibrated, varied and flexible responses and a transportability of national power in all forms.
H. Aerospace power will surely be of a distinct advantage in such a scenario.
3. The Plan now to meet the threats.
Air Marshal Chopra said “ The China-Pak tie-up gives India a potential two-front theatre in the event of war with either country. Another school of thought questions whether China and Pakistan will ever push a nuclear India into the corner of a two-front war. In the event of a localised war across the LoC between India and Pakistan, China is likely to restrict to military supplies and diplomatic pressure. India now being a closer ally of the US, the Americans as well as the Russians will prevent China from entering into a full scale war. On the other hand, if there were to be Sino-India conflict, say – limited to Arunachal, then the Pakistan Army, known for its misadventures, may jump into the fray to avenge its repeated defeats. In such a scenario, India will have to balance its forces on both fronts. With its current strength, the IAF will find it difficult to take on both the Chinese Air Force and the PAF simultaneously. In that case, the IAF would require at least 50 squadrons to deal with this threat.
In view of the above the IAF in future will have to primarily rely on Su30Mk 1, Mig 29s, Mirages and ageing Jaguars and offcourse the Tejas. The following is being planned to some how bring the strength to 42/44 squadrons ;
A. India is now moving ahead to procure 21X MiG-29 and 12 X Sukhoi-30MKI fighters from Russia, along with upgrades of their existing fleets.
B. Already there are around 40 Mk I that have been supplied to IAF in 2019-20 implying raising of two squandrons based on Tejas. For capabilities pl refer to Para 1 M above.
C. The IAF has signed a Largest ever deal in 2021 with HAL – for 73 LCA Tejas Mk-1A and 10 LCA Mk-1 versions – The first delivery will be by March 2024. In the first year i.e 2024, there will be delivery of only two aircrafts which will be ramped up to 16 by next year. Total supply time, post first delivery is 6 years, i.e by 2030 . R Madhavan, Chairman and Managing Director of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) said in an interview.
D. So this implies that By the time these 83 are delivered, the Tejas Mark 2 is expected to be ready for series production by 2026–27. Mr Madhvan said as the core technology is now ready, it will act as a catalyst for several other projects that are lined up, hence Mk 2 version is planned to roll-out by 2022 and first flight by 2023 and production of the Mk-2 version by 2026.
E. The acquisition of these MiG-29s will add to 59 such jets already with IAF bringing the total to 71. The 12 Sukhoi-30MKIs, in turn, will add to the 272 such jets already contracted from Russia, with the bulk of them being licensed produced by Hindustan Aeronautics. IAF has so far inducted 268 of the original 272 Sukhois, with at least nine of them being lost in crashes over the years.
F. Along with the 83 new Tejas, which will be inducted in the January 2024-December 2030 timeframe under the deal signed with HAL, the additional MiG-29s and Sukhois are meant to stem the shortfall of IAF fighter squadrons.
G. The HAL has also placed an order of ₹5,375 crore for 99 F404-GE-IN20 engines and support services with GE Aviation, USA to power the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). The co-operation with GE Aviation will be further enhanced with the manufacturing of GE F414 engines in India for the upcoming LCA Mk 2 program.
H. A Tejas naval prototype successfully completed a flight test aboard Indian Navy’s aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya in January 2020.
I. This LCA project will be followed by the AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft), which is fifth generation while the LCA is 4.5 generation, the Chairman of HAL said in his interview.
J. THE AMCA will be a stealth aircraft so it is designed for stealth and unlike the LCA, which was designed for maneuverability, the AMCA has a unique shape to achieve low radar cross-section and has got internal carriage of weapons.
Conclusion .
Given the production capability of HAL which in the year 2024 will deliver only two MK1 s and rest by 2030 and its past record where projects of upgradations got inordinately delayed it is unlikely that HAL will be able to keep the assurances and will be able to deliver all 83 Tejas Mk 1 and Mk1 A by 2030.
With upgradation of Jaguars already delayed by two years it is unlikely that India will ever be able to beef up its strength to 42-44 squadrons by 2030 without ordering additional aircrafts to fill that gap. It is said that the Govt is already on the Lookout.
By the time it does that the Mirages, the Jaguars, the Mig 29s and SUkhois will be ageing.
India has also to defend itself against a possible sizeable Chinese Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) attack. Inductions of new SAMs including the S-400 will help.
India cannot match China’s numerical strength , but the IAF can provide a sufficiently strong ‘deterrent force’. However, If the IAF continues to deplete in numbers at the current rate, it could hit a low of around 26 fighter squadrons, making fighting a two-front war a near impossibility. Hence , the first priority for the IAF and the Govt is to quickly rebuild the strength to 42 squadrons but that does not seem to be possibility with the kind of budgetary allocation to IAF. The 2020 capital budget allotment of Rs 113,734 crore ($16 billion) is 29 percent short of the requirement.
Although Air Chief Marshal R.K.S. Bhadauria has said that India is prepared to fight a two-front war, if needed. But behind this assertion it is clear that India is right now and even till 2030 not likely be able to deal with two front war.
The fact that India is going for a large number of emergency procurement shows that we are far from being prepared to fight a full-fledged two-front war.
Many learned scholars may argue that A full-fledged two-front war, where both Pakistan and China engage individually but simultaneously, in the western, northern, central and the north-eastern sector is too distant a possibility for now, but the Nation’s security cannot be left to possibilities and so India must prepare for the worst scenario.
However, without pushing the HAL and roping in Private sector and making emergency procurements it is unlikely that by 2030 India will have full 42 squadrons ready for combat.
So, one can safely assume that, it remains numerically in a state of under strength; and consecutive delays in modernisation efforts mean that by the time the new force composition is fully in place, China will most likely be operating fifth generation J-20s in relatively large numbers, for which the IAF will have no adequate answer.
In addition to above, even India’s air defence system is not better than what the Chinese or the Pakistanis have. The IAF Chief was candid enough to admit that China’s strength lies in its missiles. India has ordered a new air defence system — the S-400 — from Russia. Air defence is something that India seriously lacks. A medium-range surface-to-air missile system that was to be developed indigenously by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) with Israeli collaboration remains a work in progress even a decade after the contract was signed with the IAF.